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Abstract This paper investigates the effect of mobile payment on the adoption and
use of traditional payment instruments such as cash, checks, and credit, debit and pre-
paid cards at the point of sale (POS). Data are from a 2012 representative survey on
consumer payment choice in the United States. Using discrete-choice random utility
models to simulate consumer behavior, the estimation provides two major findings.
First, mobile payment does not replace physical payment cards, but is likely to substi-
tute for paper-based payment methods such as cash and checks at the adoption stage.
Second, mobile payment does not statistically significantly influence the choice of
payment means at the POS in terms of usage. However, there is suggestive evidence
that it is complementary to card payments and a substitute for paper-based payment
instruments. The findings highlight the potential social welfare gains of mobile pay-
ment and provide key insights into challenging issues for the private industry sector.
This paper furthermore offers novel evidence on the impact of mobile payment on the
use and adoption of existing payment instruments and contributes to the literature on
consumer payment choice.
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The availability of an increasing number of different payment instruments and of new
online payment opportunities offers individuals various payment alternatives from
which to choose. For instance, these days, consumers can select from among at least
nine payment instruments in the United States that—apart from cash—either autho-
rize the transfer of money or can access funds in checking and other deposit accounts
to initiate payments (Schuh and Stavins 2014). Traditional banking payment services
are facing increasingly fierce competition from novel and established nonfinancial
companies such as Paypal, Google, Apple and Square, to mention just a few. These
companies are attempting to gain market share in the retail payment markets with
innovative products such as mobile payment that offers technological advances in
payment processing and more convenience.1 Therefore, the effects on consumer pay-
ment choice of mobile payment systems have been attracting increasing attention from
researchers.
This paper studies the effect ofmobile payment on the adoption andusagepatterns of
traditional payment instruments used at the point of sale (POS) and provides empirical
evidence of actual changes in the composition of payment instrument portfolios as
well as the instruments’ deployment. Mobile payment can be used to make purchases
and, therefore, may compete or complement current POS payment means (e.g., cash,
checks, and credit, debit and prepaid cards). Mobile payment also offers a new access
channel to account-based payment services such as online banking payments and bank
account number payments (Kim et al. 2010). For the purpose of this study, however,
POS payments are exclusively focused on since they account for the majority of
consumer payments in the United States (Schuh and Stavins 2014).2 The multiple
fields of application and the high market penetration of mobile phones suggest that
mobile payment may become a very popular means of payment. The paper, therefore,
aims to provide insight into the complementing or substituting patterns of mobile
payment and its potential welfare gains.
This paper is motivated by recent developments in payment markets, in which
innovative mobile payment products have been frequently launched and the interre-
lation between payment alternatives is still unclear. Understanding these effects is
important for the following reasons. First, consumer payment instrument choices for
transactional purposes significantly affect the efficiency and effectiveness of an over-
all payment system, which in turn determines financial stability. Since the payment
system in the United States predominantly relies on paper-based payment methods
(Schuh and Stavins 2014), which cause high inefficiencies and high operation costs—
for instance, due to the handling and distribution of cash—a shift to more electronic
payments would confer an overall economic surplus (cf. Schmiedel et al. 2013). In
1 Mobile payment is here defined as any payment that is authorized, initiated, or confirmed through amobile
device (Au and Kauffman 2008). It is usually debit and credit cards that determine the underlying payment
process and settlement of payment. However, other forms such as bank account deduction or charges to
phone bills are also common. The reader is referred to Liu et al. (2015) for a survey of recent changes in
the mobile payment technology ecosystem.
2 According to Schuh and Stavins (2014), 68.1 % of the total average monthly payments a consumer made
in 2012 were non-bill payments.
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general, substituting electronic payment instruments for cash is found to be associated
with decreasing social costs (e.g., van Hove 2008; Humphrey et al. 2001). In addition,
a transfer of conventional card payments to mobile payments may create economic
value due to expected lower fee structures. Investigating these effects is supported by
the strategic plan for 2012–2016 issued by the Federal Reserve Financial Services in
the United States, which highlights enhancing the understanding of end-user needs
for and barriers to payment system efficiency and speed (Pianalto 2012).
Second, comprehending and anticipating the impact of mobile payment and its
implications for traditional payment services is fundamental since mobile payment
could create market disruptions and threaten financial stability. For instance, mobile
payment—especially applications that are operated by non-bank market players—
may raise new policy issues and challenge the existing regulatory framework posing
new liability issues. Providing detailed information on the effects and implications
of mobile payment to policymakers and regulatory authorities could facilitate their
decision-making processes in regard to this new financial landscape.
Third, assessing the impact of mobile payment is also relevant to other market
participants, especially those in the private industry sector. On the one hand, banks
and other financial intermediaries may experience eroding revenue streams due to
these new mobile payment applications. On the other hand, mobile network operators
(MNO) may benefit from new revenue streams stemming from charging conventional
payment service providers for the right to undertake payments using their systems. The
findings of this paper will, therefore, provide information to mobile payment stake-
holders of the private industry that will be useful in making strategic and investment
decisions.
This paper contributes to the literature on payment economics with respect to con-
sumer payment choice and sheds light on the dynamics betweenmobile and traditional
paymentmethods. To the best ofmy knowledge, there has not been any literature solely
targeting the effect of mobile payment on conventional payment means, a lacuna men-
tioned by Dahlberg et al. (2008) and more recently reemphasized by Dahlberg et al.
(2015). However, a few disruption analysis studies conclude that card payments would
continue to be preferred to mobile payments from an industry point of view and that
the latter tend to be more of a complement than a substitute for traditional payment
methods in Switzerland (cf. Ondrus and Pigneur 2005, 2006a, b). In contrast, others
propose that mobile payment reduces the use of central bank cash as well as credit
and debit card payments (e.g., Garcia-Swartz et al. 2002). Polasik et al. (2013) argue
that contactless mobile payment, used for proximity payments at the POS, will lead
to a breakthrough in payment markets due to its superior time efficiency compared
to cash. It is thus ambiguous what effect mobile payment will have. Consequently,
this paper provides better knowledge of and empirical evidence on consumer payment
habits and how they have changed in the context of mobile payment.
This paper is unique in several regards. First and foremost, it is the first study to
gauge the impact of mobile payment on the array of traditional payment methods
used at the POS. Second, the richness and quality of a unique data set allow for a
detailed assessment of the impact of mobile payment technologies on conventional
payment instruments, as well as in terms of adoption rates and usage behavior. Third,
the individual-consumer-level data set enables estimating random utility models that
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quantify the effect of mobile payment for varying control variables. From this vantage
point, substitution patterns across the current payment instruments will be evaluated
and potential market disruptions will be clarified.
To this end, discrete-choice econometric models are applied on the probability of
adopting and using conventional payment instruments such as cash, checks, and debit,
credit, and prepaid cards with regard to mobile payment at the POS. Drawing data
from the 2012 survey of consumer payment choice (SCPC) in the United States, this
analysis yields the following important findings. First, mobile payment statistically
significantly increases the probability of possessing all available payment instruments
at the POS by roughly 2 % points and reduces the likelihood of adopting payment
portfolios comprising checks and only cash (the extensive margin). This implies that
mobile payment is not a substitute for physical payment cards, but does act as one
for paper-based payment products. Second, mobile payment does not statistically
significantly impact consumer payment choice at the POS in terms of usage (the
intensive margin) with the exception of prepaid card payments, which are positively
affected by mobile payment. However, there is an indication that mobile payment can
be regarded as complementary to traditional card payments and as a substitute for
paper-based payment instruments such as cash and checks. The results may reflect
the fact that the usage of payment instruments strongly depends on other factors, such
as perceived characteristics of payment methods, individual habits, and automatism,
among others.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related
payment literature that focuses on the choice of payment methods, including the lit-
erature on mobile payment. In Sect. 3, the framework of the random utility model
is introduced and the theoretical background of its properties is provided. In Sect. 4,
explanation of the identification strategy and the specification of the models used for
estimation is given. The data are described in Sect. 5. Section 6 discusses the esti-
mation results and compares the model specifications based on their overall fit of the
data. A plausibility check is run in Sect. 7 to validate the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to a growing body of work on payment economics dealing with
the determinants of consumer payment choice. The bulk of empirical studies rely on
individual-level survey data due to the general unavailability of accurate transactional-
level data.3 In sum, the payment literature concludes that the adoption and usage of
electronic payment instruments is primarily determined by personal, transactional, and
situational characteristics, aswell as by payment instrument attributes. Price character-
istics and financial incentives are also strong predictors of adoption and deployment.
3 There are a few studies based on transactional-level data provided by stores (scanner data), banks or
credit card companies (e.g., Cohen and Rysman 2013; Agarwal et al. 2010; Klee 2008; Rysman 2007).
Other papers focus on consumer payment choice over time using aggregate data sources provided by
central banks or payment systems (e.g., Humphrey et al. 1996, 2001; Snellman et al. 2001; Amromin and
Chakravorti 2009).
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Several studies find that socioeconomic and financial attributes of consumers are
relevant to payment choice (Schuh and Stavins 2010; Borzekowski et al. 2008; Stavins
2001).Younger,more educated cohortswith higher incomes aremore likely to use elec-
tronic payment instruments than are elderly, less educated people with lower incomes,
who tend to prefer paper-based payment methods such as cash. One reason for this
phenomenon is that the first group faces higher opportunity costs when using paper-
based methods, which generally take more time to settle (Polasik et al. 2013). Other
research discovers an influence of region and foreign background. For instance, con-
sumer patterns of payment instrument usage are highly affected by the fraction of
other people in the region using the same type of payment method (Stavins 2001).
Kosse and Jansen (2013), using Dutch data, find that a foreign background continues
to influence payment instrument choice even after migration; that is, migrants from
cash-oriented countries are more prone to use cash even after they migrate.
A plethora of literature deals with the effect on payment choice of transaction size,
type of good purchased, and spending location. The size of a transaction is a leading
indicator for the choice of payment method at the POS (von Kalckreuth et al. 2014;
Cohen and Rysman 2013; Klee 2008; Bounie and François 2006).4 The bigger the
transaction, the more likely it is that people will pay with payment cards. Conversely,
cash usage dominates small-value purchases. In contrast to these findings, Bouhdaoui
and Bounie (2012) and Eschelbach and Schmidt (2013) argue that payment choice
is more driven by the outstanding amount of cash in the consumer’s wallet than by
transaction size.
There are a number of influential empirical papers that investigate the impact of
price and financial incentives on payment choice. Overall, consumers are very price
sensitive. For instance,many scholars find avery elastic response to fees and surcharges
imposed on debit card transactions, inferring consumers to substitute for alternative
payment methods (Koulayev et al. 2012; Stavins 2011; Borzekowski et al. 2008; Bolt
et al. 2010).
There is separate literature that highlights the significant and positive effects of
loyalty programs and other financial incentives (card discounts, points, cash-back,
interest-free periods) on the use of payment cards instead of cash (Arango et al. 2015b;
Carbó-Valverde and Lin˝ares-Zegarra 2011; Ching and Hayashi 2010; Simon et al.
2010; Agarwal et al. 2010). Moreover, credit card charges inhibit credit card revolvers
to pay with these cards and motivate revolvers to pay by debit card instead (Zinman
2009).5
With regard tomobile payment, this paper takes as its basis empirical work pointing
out the importance of certain payment instrument attributes, including convenience,
ease of use, speed, record keeping, and security, when choosing a payment method
(e.g., Arango et al. 2015a; Ching and Hayashi 2010; Schuh and Stavins 2010; Klee
2008). Overall, these attributes are found to be more important than demographic
variables. Mobile payment is viewed as being more convenient, cheaper, and capable
of providing better records (Mallat 2007). It can, therefore, improve the attractive-
4 See Arango et al. (2013) for an international comparison.
5 See also Massoud et al. (2011) who find that card interest rates are direct substitutes for card penalty fees,
which are increasing in customer risk.
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ness of electronic card payments, as it enhances their convenience by technological
modifications (Jonker 2007). Conversely, personal experience with mobile payment is
found to negatively influence cost-conscious payment choice behavior such as choos-
ing cash at the POS (European Commission 2013).6 This analysis aims to fill the gap
in understanding these mechanisms.
In another vein, mobile payment is also extensively studied from the perspective
of behavioral decisions and intentions in regard to innovations (for a synopsis and
relevant references, see Dahlberg et al. 2008, 2015).7 The adoption and usage of
mobile payment are found to be influenced by the relative importance of certain factors
such as trust, usefulness, ease of use, external influences, and personal traits, among
others (Xin et al. 2015; Liébana-Cabanillas et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2012; Kim et al.
2010). Perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, and trust are found to be the most
important factors in the context of mobile payment use (Dahlberg et al. 2015). On
the contrary, Mallat (2007) shows that the relative advantages of mobile payment
are different from those of traditional adoption theories, in that it offers ubiquity of
payment, independence of time, queue avoidance, and the ability to complement cash
payments.
3 Model specification of payment choice
The behavioralmodel of payment choice is derived from the randomutility framework,
which explains decision behavior (cf. Train 2009). The description of payment deci-
sions in discrete-choice models is based on the utility maximizing choice between
discrete alternatives and allows estimating consumer preferences between choices.
Formally, there is a decision maker i who faces a choice among J payment alterna-
tives where each alternative provides a certain level of utility.Ui j , j = 1, . . . , J is the
utility level a decision maker faces when choosing payment method j . If Ui j > Uik
for all k = j holds, then the alternative j is selected. In other words, the payment
alternative yielding the highest utility is the one that is chosen such that
Vi j = maxUi j . (1)
The decision maker’s utility can be decomposed as
Ui j = Vi j + εi j (2)
where Vi j is a function that relates observed factors to the decision maker’s utility.
This function is denoted Vi j = V (Xi , S j , β j , γ )∀ j , where the factors are attributes
of decision maker Xi and of the payment alternatives S j . It is called representative
utility. Vi j also depends on unknown parameters β j and γ , which have to be estimated.
β j relates the attributes of decision maker Xi to his utility for choice j . γ shows the
6 Cost-consciousness in this context represents transparency of payment charges.
7 The reader is referred to Au and Kauffman (2008) for a survey of stakeholder issues in the field of mobile
payment.
123
The impact of mobile payment on payment choice 305
relationship between the decisionmaker and the alternatives to his utility for alternative
j . Since some factors cannot be observed, and therefore are not included in Vi j , but do
affect utility, they are captured by εi j , which is assumed to be randomly distributed.
It can be viewed as the error made in evaluating alternative j . Since εi j is simply the
difference between Ui j and Vi j , this decomposition is completely general.
The logit model is obtained by assuming that each εi j is an independently and
identically distributed extreme value (i.i.d.), implying homogeneous error variances.
This distribution is referred to as extreme value type-I, sometimes called the Gumbel
distribution, leading to the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
Put differently, the consumer’s preference for payment method j over method k is
independent of the availability of other alternatives.8 The density and cumulative
distribution of εi j is, respectively,
f (εi j ) = exp(−εi j ) exp(− exp(−εi j )) (3)
and
F(εi j ) = exp(− exp(−εi j )). (4)
Under this assumption, the probability that decision maker i chooses payment alter-
native j over k is given by
Pi j = Prob(Ui j > Uik,∀k = j) (5)
= Prob(Vi j + εi j > Vik + εik,∀k = j) (6)
= exp(Vi j )∑J
k=1 exp(Vik)
. (7)
Equation (7) requires that the probabilities lie between zero and one and that they
must sum to one. That the above choice probabilities lead to i.i.d. extreme value
distributed errors was proven by McFadden (1973). The basic setup in Eq. (7) is
referred to as the multinomial logit model (MNL), where the utility of all payment
alternatives depends on the same factors, such as personal characteristics Xi , resulting
in the binary logit model for J = 1. In the conditional logit model (CL), the utility
of each payment alternative solely depends on attributes S j of that alternative, which
vary across alternatives. The conjunction of thesemodels is themixed conditional logit
model where both alternative- and case-specific variables are included. These models
allow inferring consumers’ structural behavioral responses using the estimates of the
model to perform counterfactual experiments in the consumer choice set. Because the
logit probabilities take a closed form and are fairly easily computed, the traditional
maximum likelihood procedure can be employed. For more details on the estimation
procedure with maximum likelihood, see Train (2009).
8 This problem is not very likely to occur so starkly in the context of payment instrument adoption since
the choice set for payment methods at the POS is more finite. According to Borzekowski and Kiser (2008),
the IIA assumption can be relaxed (on an aggregate level) if interaction terms between individual- and
alternative-specific attributes are included.
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These models, however, can explain taste variation only to the extent that tastes
vary with the observed characteristics of individual i . In the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity and to relax the IIA assumption, however, random coefficient models
are necessary to avoid biased estimates. The nested logit model (NL) is regarded as
the most tractable of these more general multinomial logit models, where the vector
of the payment instrument error terms εi j exhibits the generalized value distribution
(GEV) with the following cumulative distribution function (see Train 2009)9:

















In thismodel, the alternatives J are partitioned into groups L with each alternative j
belonging to an upper nest B. It can be thought of as a decision treewhere the consumer
first decides which nest to choose and then, within the nest, the alternative is selected.
The error terms are allowed to be correlated within nests, but are uncorrelated across
nests following an univariate extreme value distribution. Consequently, the probability












The parameter λl measures the correlation between alternatives within the different
nests, that is, the degree of independence in unobserved utility. The higher λl , the
less correlation within nests. According to Train (2009), the model is consistent with
utility maximization for all values of the explanatory variables if λl is between zero
and one, but only for some range of variables if λl is greater than one.
4 Identification strategy
In this section, the econometric models of consumer payment choice are described,
which are directly derived from the random utility model set out above. Consumer
payment behavior can be thought of as a two-step decision process. First, individuals
decide whether to adopt a specific payment instrument, leading to the possession of
different payment portfolios (the extensive margin). Second, they choose howmuch to
use each adopted instrument in different contexts (the intensive margin). In this study,
the two different processes aremodeled independently and sequentially. This approach
is selected since individuals usually have to first apply for a payment card before they
can use it. In addition, this paper aims to provide evidence on the causal effect of
mobile payment on either the adoption or the usage stage of traditional payment
9 In addition, the mixed logit model allows for random parameters by varying the elements of β over the
decision makers (see Train 2009).
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instruments, rather than both simultaneously. On the one hand, mobile payment might
replace physical payment cards due to electronic storing of payment card information,
which negatively affects the adoption stage. On the other hand, mobile payment might
promote electronic transactions, which positively affects the usage stage.10 It is thus
appropriate to consider these issues separately.
In Sect. 4.1, first, potential endogeneity issues related to empirical strategy are
dealt with, allowing to correctly estimate the impact of mobile payment on payment
choice. Second, the model specification that identifies the impact of mobile payment
in the adoption stage is discussed in Sect. 4.2. Third, Sect. 4.3 sets out the econometric
specification associated with the impact of mobile payment in the use stage.
4.1 Identifying assumptions
Based on the random utility model above, a stylized utility function to estimate the
effect of mobile payment on the choice of payment method j is specified as follows:
Ui j = V (MPi , Xi , S j ) + εi j (10)
The observed utility V (·) of individual i can be described as a function of mobile
payment MPi , consumer characteristics Xi , and payment instrument attributes S j . εi j
captures the measurement error. It is important to note that the variable MPi has to
be strictly exogenous to estimate an unbiased effect in the adoption and usage stage.
However, several endogeneity issues are likely to appear in this context. First, selection
bias may be prevalent due to unobservable factors causing consumers to adopt mobile
payment and simultaneously decrease the number of paper-based payment methods.
For example, consumers who are keen on new technologymay have fewer paper-based
payment means to begin with and be more likely to adopt innovations such as mobile
payment. Similarly, this holds for usage of mobile payment. For these people, the
utility of mobile payment is greater than for others.
Second, the direction of causation of MPi is not obvious and could be the reverse.
For instance, consumers who tend to pay less often with cash may be more prone to
use innovative payment alternatives such as mobile payment.11
To obtain an unbiased causal parameter of MPi , the aforementioned endogeneity
issues can be largely circumvented by including individuals’ perceptions of the char-
acteristics of traditional payment instruments, thus capturing consumer preferences
that otherwise would have been unobserved heterogeneity (cf. Ching and Hayashi
10 Koulayev et al. (2012) develop a structural model of simultaneous adoption and use of payment instru-
ments accounting for the amount of usage at the time of adoption while at the same time identifying the
effect of use on adoption.
11 Another important endogeneity issue stems from the two-sided structure of the payment market where
network effects are dominating. In other words, the interdependence of supply and demand for payment
methods by merchants and consumers, respectively, results in feedback effects. One result could be higher
utility for consumers who have adopted payment alternatives that are ubiquitously accepted by merchants.
Consumers’ perceived acceptance of payment methods can largely explain their various payment choices,
which is what the survey of consumer payment choice (SCPC) contends (see below). However, due to data
restrictions, an adequate control for this issue from the seller’s point of view is not possible.
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2010; Schuh and Stavins 2010; Jonker 2007). Moreover, assessing attitudes toward
mobile payment allows controlling for heterogeneous effects ofmobile payment across
consumers and for other unobservables such as personal affinity for innovation.12
Therefore, consumer preferences for payment alternatives can be fully explained by
the alternatives’ perceived characteristics, thus removing unobserved heterogeneity.
Nevertheless, it is completely plausible that the error terms could be correlated
across payment alternatives since different groups of payment methods have similar
unobservable characteristics. Such a circumstance would violate the IIA assumption.
For instance, paper-based payment methods such as cash are anonymous, but also
transparent (that is, it is hard to ignore the “pain of paying”), whereas using a payment
card can mask the pain of paying, but leaves a data trail and offers (nearly) unlim-
ited liquidity and credit. Additionally, payment decision making is considered to be
largely habitual and unconscious (van der Horst and Matthijsen 2013), implying that
consumers often have preferences for a certain type of payment instrument, be it paper
or plastic. While the IIA assumption is likely to be violated in the usage stage due to
the above-mentioned arguments, it is assumed to hold true in the adoption stage. The
rationale is that it is unlikely that choosing a specific payment instrument portfolio is
dependent on whether there is an option to choose another bundle.
Another methodological issue pertains to sample selection in the usage stage, as
the adoption of payment instruments is a prerequisite for their usage. However, since
the penetration of available POS payment instruments is relatively advanced (see
Table 2) and assuming that the adoption and use decisions are made sequentially and
not simultaneously, sample selection bias in the usage stage should be negligible. In
support of this, evidence is provided by Schuh and Stavins (2013), who found that
the Mills ratios of the first-stage probit models in the usage stage of POS payment
means are insignificant in the majority of cases. A similar issue arises in the context
of mobile phone ownership, seeing as such devices are necessary for mobile payment.
However, because the rate of mobile phone diffusion is relatively high (around 95 %),
this should not be a problem.
4.2 Estimating the adoption of payment instruments
Specification of the utility function is crucial to identification of the effect of mobile
payment in the adoption stage. To this end, work by Schuh and Stavins (2013) is
referred. The econometric model using the (mixed) conditional logit method is esti-
mated. Since consumers are very heterogeneous in their adoption patterns of payment
instruments (Schuh and Stavins 2014), that is, they generally adopt several different
payment methods instead of a single instrument, it makes sense to proceed by deter-
mining the observed individual payment portfolios, each of which is comprised of
instruments solely applicable at the POS. Doing so has the advantage of identifying
an exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and finite number of discrete alternatives, which is
a prerequisite of the conditional logit model.
12 It is conceivable that consumers who rate characteristics of mobile payment more positively than others
have higher coefficients than consumers who rate these characteristics less favorably.
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Available payment instruments j = 1, . . . , J at the POS are cash, check, credit
card, debit card, and prepaid card, and any or every combination of them.13 Following
the approach in the spirit of Koulayev et al. (2012), the consumer selects bundle
b ∈ B, where b is a subset of all possible sets B of payment instruments. Assuming
that every consumer adopts cash, there are four payment choices remaining, leading to
the maximum number of different payment portfolios B = 16 (24). Thus, individual
i obtains the following utility from choosing bundle b:
Uib = αMPi + βXi + γYi + δZi + λRCb + εib, (11)
where individual i derives utility from choosing payment portfolio b. MPi takes the
value of one if consumer i has used any form of mobile payment. The set of demo-
graphic variables Xi includes age, gender, education and household size. The vector
Yi encompasses employment status and income. Zi consists of a dummy indicating
whether the respondent had ever been bankrupt in the 12 months prior to the survey.
In addition, the perceived assessment of mobile phones, mobile phones with Internet
access, voice calling, and texting in regard to security is included. RCb is a set of rela-
tive measures of perceived security, setup, acceptance, cost, records, and convenience
of payment instrument j belonging to bundle b (see Sect. 5.2 for variable definition).
It varies across payment portfolios (alternative-specific regressors). The case-specific
regressors, which are constant over alternatives, comprise individual characteristics
MPi , Xi ,Yi , and Zi . εib represents the unobserved preference component that is
related to the particular payment bundle and is assumed to be i.i.d.
4.3 Estimating the usage of payment instruments
Specification of the utility function in the usage stage hinges on Ching and Hayashi
(2010) and Schuh and Stavins (2013). The model is estimated using the nested logit
method that explains which payment instrument j is most frequently selected by
consumer i for each transaction type h. For the analysis, two nests (L = 2) are
constructed, where the paper-based payment methods cash and check share one nest
(Bpaper) and the remaining card-based payment alternatives (debit, credit, and prepaid
cards) share another nest (Bcard). The utility function to be estimated has the form
Ui jh = αMPi + βXi + γYi + δZi + λRC j + εi jh, (12)
whereMPi is a dummyvariable for having used any formofmobile payment in the past
12 months, Xi is a vector of consumer demographics, Yi is a set of financial variables
related to individual i , Zi are additional control variables, including the attitudinal data
on consumer valuation of mobile payment, and RC j is a vector of relative attributes
of payment method j perceived by individual i . The specific variables incorporated
in the utility function are similar to those in the adoption stage (see Eq. 11).
13 Note thatmoney orders can also be used at the POS.However, since their adoption and usage is negligible,
they are excluded from the analysis.
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Accordingly, observed heterogeneity across individuals in the model is accounted
for. To put it more simply, the marginal utility of payment method j in context h is
different across consumers. Consumer i can choose among five payment instruments
j = 1, . . . , J such as cash, check, credit card, debit card, or prepaid card to pay
for three transaction types h such as total POS payments, which is further differenti-
ated into retail payments and services payments.14 Note that the adoption decision of
available payment methods is refrained and hence every consumer irrespective of the
number of adopted instruments is focused on.
5 Data
5.1 Source
Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston that supports the Consumer Payments
Research Center (CPRC), which regularly conducts the survey of consumer payment
choice (SCPC), are used.15 The cross-sectional data set conducted in October 2012
consists of 2065 participants whose responses were weighted to represent all U.S.
consumers aged 18 years and older. The survey is implemented by the RAND Corpo-
ration as an online survey using RAND’s American Life Panel (ALP). It is a unique,
comprehensive, publicly available, and representative survey that provides detailed
payment information from individual consumers with respect to nine common pay-
ment methods in the United States.16
The survey primarily measures the adoption and use of these payment instruments
by employing a flexible reporting strategy to enhance recall and optimize accuracy in
regard to the number of payments.17 However, low-value payments, which are mostly
cash, tend to be forgotten more easily due to their high frequency and low budget
impact. Cleaning procedures were implemented for the number of monthly payments
for each payment instrument by defining upper limits based on the number of adopted
instruments and an extreme limit on the total number of monthly payments (300 total
payments) (Schuh andStavins 2014). In addition, the SCPCasks consumers to evaluate
six payment instrument characteristics for each payment method. These ratings may
be vulnerable to incomplete information, memory loss, estimation, or even subjective
14 The SCPC partitions POS payments into a third type of payment such as person-to-person payments.
However, only a minor share of transactions occur person-to-person, which is why the effect on this type
of payment is not analyzed (see Sect. 5.2). Furthermore, the focus of the analysis lies on payments made
through a retail establishment. Retail payments comprise purchases of goods at stores such as grocery
stores, superstores, department stores, and drug stores. Services payments include purchases of services
such as restaurants, bars, fast food, and beverages, transportation and tolls, doctor’s visits, child care,
haircuts, education, recreation and entertainment. Person-to-person payments are payments to people not
made through a retail establishment such as payments for allowances, paying back a friend, or gifts (cf.
Schuh and Stavins 2014).
15 The reader is referred to Schuh and Stavins (2014) for a comprehensive description of the data, a synopsis
of the results, and detailed information about the collection process.
16 These include cash, check, money order, traveler’s check, debit card, credit card, prepaid card, online
banking bill payments (OBBP), and bank account number payments (BANP).
17 Typical periods used to measure the number of payments were during a week, a month, or a year.
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Table 1 Usage of mobile
payment on an annual basis
Note: usage describes the fact that
respondents make the corresponding
type of payment at least once in a
typical year. Survey weights used
Variable Mean SD N
Total 0.18 0.38 2032
Text/SMS 0.03 0.17 2032
Contactless 0.01 0.1 2032
Scanned a barcode 0.02 0.14 2031
Mobile phone’s web browser 0.12 0.32 2032
Mobile application 0.07 0.26 2031
Device attached to mobile phone 0.06 0.24 2031
perceptions because consumers base their ratings on their own objective knowledge.
The data set also provides rich information about consumer demographics, financial
status, and state of residence. The estimates are not adjusted for seasonal variation,
inflation, or item non-response (missing values).
5.2 Description
The survey specifically asks the question whether the respondent has made any form
of mobile payment in the 12 months prior to the survey using a mobile phone. The
act of making a mobile payment is sorted into specific activities to enhance recall.
Table 1 presents the share of consumers who used mobile payment on an annual
basis distinguished by different mobile payment types. 18 % of the respondents used
mobile payment within the past year. Respondents mostly made mobile payments via
a web browser (12 %), an application (7 %), or a device attached to the mobile phone
(6 %), followed by sending a text message (3 %), scanning a barcode (2 %), or using
the contactless feature (1 %). All these methods enable the purchase of goods and
services at a stationary POS. However, the survey does not ask about the exact number
of mobile payment transactions made or how mobile payments are generally funded.
The data set also provides insight into the adoption rates of available payment
instruments at the POS (see Table 2). Not surprisingly, every respondent in the sample
has cash, as it offers ubiquitous payment. Checks are also widely adopted (85 %)
as are debit cards (78 %) and credit cards (72 %). Prepaid cards are somewhat less
preferred (52 %). In addition to summary statistics, Table 3 provides a simple mean
comparison test (t test) between mobile payment users (innovators) and non-users
(non-innovators). Interestingly, innovators possess significantly more debit and pre-
paid cards than do non-innovators (15 and 13 % points, respectively), providing ad
hoc evidence as to the preference for electronic payment methods.
However, as individuals usually adopt different payment portfolios, 16 possible
payment bundles are constructed, assuming every individual adopts cash (see Table
4). As shown in Table 4, the majority of consumers in the sample have all five payment
instruments available (around 30 %).18 Roughly 28 % of individuals adopt a portfolio
18 Available payment instruments at the POS include cash, checks, and debit, credit, and prepaid cards.
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Table 2 Adoption rates of POS
payment instruments
Note: survey weights used
Variable Mean SD N
Cash 1 0.02 2032
Check 0.85 0.35 2031
Debit card 0.78 0.41 2031
Credit card 0.72 0.45 2030
Prepaid card 0.52 0.5 2029
Table 3 Differences in adoption rates of POS payment instruments
Variable Non-innovator Innovator t test
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean diff.
Cash 1 0.02 1699 1 0 328 −0.00
Check 0.85 0.36 1697 0.87 0.34 327 −0.02
Debit card 0.76 0.43 1698 0.91 0.29 327 −0.15***
Credit card 0.71 0.45 1700 0.75 0.43 328 −0.04
Prepaid card 0.5 0.5 1701 0.63 0.48 328 −0.13***
Note: survey weights used. t test of mean differences between innovators and non-innovators. These values can differ from
true values due to rounding and weighting. Significance levels 1 % ***, 5 % **, and 10 % *
Table 4 Adoption rates of
payment portfolios
Note: survey weights used.
N = 2065. Available payment
instruments at the POS are cash,
check, debit card, credit card, and
prepaid card
Bundle Mean SD
(1) All five instruments 0.303 0.46
(2) Cash, debit, credit, prepaid 0.012 0.107
(3) Cash, check, credit, prepaid 0.047 0.211
(4) Cash, check, debit, prepaid 0.074 0.261
(5) Cash, check, debit, credit 0.275 0.447
(6) Cash, check, debit 0.075 0.264
(7) Cash, check, credit 0.070 0.255
(8) Cash, check, prepaid 0.007 0.083
(9) Cash, debit, credit 0.009 0.096
(10) Cash, debit, prepaid 0.024 0.153
(11) Cash, credit, prepaid 0.005 0.073
(12) Cash, check 0.004 0.065
(13) Cash, debit 0.015 0.121
(14) Cash, credit 0.003 0.055
(15) Cash, prepaid 0.053 0.225
(16) Only cash 0.024 0.152
of four instruments including no prepaid cards and around 7 % including no credit
cards. The payment instrument portfolios “cash, check, debit” and “cash, check, credit”
are held by around 7 % of individuals. A cash accompanied by prepaid cards portfolio
is found for 5 % of consumers; around 2 % rely solely on cash.
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Table 5 Differences in adoption rates of payment portfolios
Bundle Non-innovator Innovator t test
Mean SD Mean SD Mean diff.
(1) All five instruments 0.271 0.445 0.446 0.498 −0.175***
(2) Cash, debit, credit, prepaid 0.012 0.111 0.008 0.09 0.004
(3) Cash, check, credit, prepaid 0.055 0.228 0.011 0.104 0.044***
(4) Cash, check, debit, prepaid 0.075 0.264 0.066 0.249 0.009
(5) Cash, check, debit, credit 0.277 0.448 0.265 0.442 0.012
(6) Cash, check, debit 0.079 0.27 0.06 0.238 0.019
(7) Cash, check, credit 0.084 0.277 0.006 0.079 0.078***
(8) Cash, check, prepaid 0.006 0.075 0.012 0.111 −0.007
(9) Cash, debit, credit 0.008 0.089 0.015 0.122 −0.007
(10) Cash, debit, prepaid 0.021 0.144 0.037 0.188 −0.016
(11) Cash, credit, prepaid 0.006 0.079 0.001 0.031 0.005
(12) Cash, check 0.005 0.071 0 0 0.005**
(13) Cash, debit 0.015 0.123 0.013 0.115 0.002
(14) Cash, credit 0.004 0.06 0 0 0.004
(15) Cash, prepaid 0.055 0.227 0.049 0.215 0.006
(16) Only cash 0.027 0.161 0.01 0.1 0.017
N 1688 327
Note: t test of mean differences between innovators and non-innovators. These values can differ from true values due to
rounding and weighting. Significance levels 1 % ***, 5 % **, and 10 % *. Survey weights used
Additionally, a simple mean comparison test between innovators and non-
innovators indicates significant differences in the adoption rates of payment bundles
(see Table 5). First, mobile payment users have statistically significantly higher
adoption rates of the payment portfolio encompassing all payment methods than do
non-users (around 18 % points). Second, these consumers adopt the portfolios “cash,
check, credit, prepaid”, “cash, check, credit”, and “cash, check” significantly less
often than non-users. What these bundles have in common is the absence of debit
cards, which seem to be linked to mobile payment users.
To estimate the impact of mobile payment on the use of traditional payment meth-
ods, Table 6 sets out descriptive statistics regarding the number of transactionsmade by
different payment methods for various transactions types within a month. On average,
consumers undertake roughly 43 POS payments a month, of which 24 are retail and
15 services payments.19 These are usually paid in cash (around 16 POS transactions,
nine and six retail and services transactions, respectively). Debit cards are the second
often most used in these contexts: around 13 POS payments a month including eight
and five retail and services transactions, respectively. Credit cards are somewhat less
frequently deployed, with an average of nine POS transactions entailing six retail and
19 Note that person-to-person payments account for around three transactions out of the total POSpayments.
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Table 6 Number of
transactions per month by
payment instrument and type
Note: survey weights used.
N = 2041. Subcategories do not
exactly sum to main category due to
rounding, weighting, and omitting
money orders and person-to-person
payments
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Total POS payments 42.83 37.27 0 302.56
Cash 16.18 19.86 0 126.1
Check 2.84 5.7 0 41.67
Debit card 13.14 19.8 0 111.89
Credit card 9.42 18.1 0 130.45
Prepaid card 0.62 2.74 0 35
Retail payments 24.12 23.69 0 154.79
Cash 8.66 12.26 0 65.22
Check 1.23 3.3 0 30
Debit card 8.16 13.24 0 86.96
Credit card 5.63 11.47 0 78.27
Prepaid card 0.35 1.77 0 21.74
Services payments 15.37 16.48 0 130.45
Cash 5.61 8.93 0 86.96
Check 1.11 2.59 0 21.74
Debit card 4.66 8.4 0 80
Credit card 3.66 8 0 65.22
Prepaid card 0.27 1.53 0 26.09
four services payments. Checks, and most prominently, prepaid cards are not very
popular for use at the POS (roughly three transactions).
Comparing the means of innovators and non-innovators with a t test reveals that
the former undertake significantly more POS payments than the latter (approximately
six additional transactions, see Table 7). This is also the case for debit card POS
payments (around five transactions) while, in contrast, innovators make roughly one
less check POS transaction than do non-innovators. Moreover, significant differences
are observed in retail payments paidwith checks and prepaid cards formobile payment
users (approximately 0.5 and 0.2 fewer transactions, respectively) as well as with
debit cards (around three payments more). Innovators overall pay more frequently for
services than non-innovators, namely around two transactions. They use their debit
cards significantly more and checks less often for this transaction type, respectively
(roughly 2 vs. 0.5 transactions). Note that the survey does not report which and how
many card payments are initiated, authorized or confirmed through a mobile phone.
To analyze the effect of mobile payment on the usage of payment instruments, an
individual dummy variable indicating the most frequently used payment method for
every transaction type at the POS is constructed. Table 8 presents the payment choice
frequencies in the sample and reveals that debit cards are the most preferred payment
instrument followed by cash (around 37 vs. 35%). 21% of consumers most frequently
choose credit cards, whereas checks and prepaid cards are less frequently selected as
primary payment choice (4 vs. 1 %). Interestingly, consumers do not significantly vary
their primary payment instrument across different transaction types such as retail and
services payments.
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Table 7 Differences of transactions per month by payment instrument and type
Variable Non-innovator Innovator t test
Mean SD Max. Mean SD Max. Mean diff.
Total POS payments 42.1 36.46 302.56 47.84 40.29 236.67 −5.74**
Cash 16.42 19.84 117.4 15.72 20.1 126.1 0.7
Check 3.09 5.95 41.67 1.82 4.33 41 1.27***
Debit card 12.28 18.89 108.71 17.55 23.25 111.89 −5.27***
Credit card 9.08 17.45 130.45 11.34 20.96 109.04 −2.26
Prepaid card 0.61 2.69 35 0.65 3 26.09 −0.04
Retail payments 23.74 23.04 138.46 26.8 26.37 154.79 −3.05
Cash 8.85 12.3 65.22 8.14 12.19 65.22 0.71
Check 1.33 3.41 30 0.82 2.82 23 0.50**
Debit card 7.67 12.73 86.96 10.74 15.26 86.96 −3.08***
Credit card 5.44 11 78.27 6.73 13.52 65.22 −1.28
Prepaid card 0.38 1.89 21.74 0.22 1.08 13.04 0.16*
Services payments 15.04 16.18 130.45 17.48 17.73 87.05 −2.44*
Cash 5.7 8.99 86.96 5.43 8.77 52.18 0.27
Check 1.23 2.76 21.74 0.59 1.58 15 0.65***
Debit card 4.29 7.84 80 6.55 10.48 52.18 −2.26***
Credit card 3.52 7.71 65.22 4.46 9.27 43.48 −0.93
Prepaid card 0.23 1.21 26.09 0.43 2.51 21.74 −0.20
N 1704 328
Note: subcategories do not exactly sum to main category due to rounding, weighting, and omitting money orders and
person-to-person payments. N = 2, 041. For brevity, the minimum is dropped but equals zero for every type of payment. t
test of mean differences between innovators and non-innovators. These values can differ from true values due to rounding
and weighting. Significance levels 1% ***, 5% **, and 10% *. Survey weights used
Table 8 Payment choice frequencies in the sample
Variable Total POS payments Retail payments Services payments
Cash 0.352 0.355 0.353
Check 0.040 0.044 0.069
Debit card 0.368 0.376 0.353
Credit card 0.210 0.216 0.214
Prepaid card 0.012 0.015 0.014
Note: survey weights used. The share of payment instruments most frequently used is displayed. Total POS payments do
not include person-to-person payments
The survey also provides rich information about consumer financial and demo-
graphic characteristics. Table 9 compares individual attributes of innovators with those
of non-innovators by a simple mean t test. Statistically significant differences are
observable. Mobile payment users are generally younger, more educated and richer
than non-innovators. They are mostly male, work, are more likely to already have
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Table 9 Sample summary statistics
Variable Non-innovator Innovator t test
Mean SD Min. Max. N Mean SD Min. Max. N Mean diff.
Age
<25 0.05 0.22 0 1 1704 0.09 0.29 0 1 328 −0.03∗∗∗
25–34 0.21 0.41 0 1 1704 0.4 0.49 0 1 328 −0.21∗∗∗
35–44 0.13 0.34 0 1 1704 0.24 0.43 0 1 328 −0.09∗∗∗
45–54 0.2 0.4 0 1 1704 0.15 0.36 0 1 328 0.04
55–64 0.18 0.39 0 1 1704 0.08 0.28 0 1 328 0.11∗∗∗
>65 0.22 0.42 0 1 1704 0.03 0.18 0 1 328 0.18∗∗∗
Education
<High school 0.08 0.27 0 1 1704 0.05 0.22 0 1 328 0.01
High school 0.37 0.48 0 1 1704 0.26 0.44 0 1 328 0.08∗∗∗
Some college 0.28 0.45 0 1 1704 0.31 0.46 0 1 328 0.02
College 0.15 0.36 0 1 1704 0.24 0.43 0 1 328 −0.08∗∗∗
Post graduate 0.12 0.33 0 1 1704 0.14 0.35 0 1 328 −0.02
Income (in 1000)
<25 0.24 0.43 0 1 1701 0.16 0.37 0 1 328 0.05 ∗ ∗
25–49 0.26 0.44 0 1 1701 0.23 0.42 0 1 328 0.01
50–74 0.18 0.38 0 1 1701 0.21 0.41 0 1 328 0.00
75–99 0.12 0.32 0 1 1701 0.18 0.38 0 1 328 −0.02
100–124 0.1 0.29 0 1 1701 0.07 0.25 0 1 328 0.02
>125 0.11 0.31 0 1 1701 0.14 0.35 0 1 328 −0.06∗∗∗
Employment
Working 0.57 0.5 0 1 1704 0.78 0.42 0 1 328 −0.19∗∗∗
Retired 0.23 0.42 0 1 1704 0.04 0.2 0 1 328 0.18 ∗ ∗
Unemployed 0.09 0.29 0 1 1704 0.1 0.3 0 1 328 −0.01
Others
Male 0.47 0.5 0 1 1704 0.54 0.5 0 1 328 −0.07 ∗ ∗
Female 0.53 0.5 0 1 1704 0.46 0.5 0 1 328 0.07 ∗ ∗
Household size 2.9 1.59 1 11 1704 3.34 1.71 1 11 328 −0.39∗∗∗
Bankruptcy 0.01 0.08 0 1 1693 0.03 0.18 0 1 326 −0.02∗∗∗
Note: survey weights used. Bankruptcy refers to having been bankrupt in the past 12 months. t test of mean differences
between innovators and non-innovators. These values can differ from true values due to rounding and weighting. Signifi-
cance levels 1 % ***, 5 % **, and 10 % *
been bankrupt once, and live in larger households, all of which is in line with previous
studies (see Sect. 2).
To sum up, the descriptives show that there are significant differences in the
adoption and usage patterns of mobile payment users and non-users. There is
suggestive evidence that mobile payment influences the adoption of particular pay-
ment portfolios—especially toward holding all payment instruments—and leads to
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increased usage of debit cards and decreased usage of checks for overall POS pay-
ments. In addition, consumers who are younger, richer, more educated and male are
more likely to use mobile payment technology. As a whole, individuals in the sample
most frequently pay by debit cards and cash at the POS.
As pointed out in Sect. 2, perceived characteristics of payment instruments explain
a significant amount of the variation in payment methods. A major advantage of the
SCPC is that respondents—both adopters and non-adopters of payment instruments—
assessed attributes such as security, setup, acceptance, cost, records, and convenience
for every payment instrument on an absolute scale from one to five, where higher
numbers mean a more favorable assessment.
For the purpose of this paper, the perceived characteristics of every paymentmethod
applicable at the POS were constructed as the average of each respondent’s perception
of each payment method relative to every other payment method at the POS similar
to the approach in Schuh and Stavins (2013). They were calculated as







where k describes the six characteristics (security, setup, acceptance, cost, records, and
convenience), i indexes the consumer, j relates to the payment instrument applicable
at the POS, and j ′ is every other payment instrument besides j that is commonly used
at the POS. For the baseline specification and to account for the number of available
payment instruments, the log relative characteristics were transformed as
RCki ( j) ≡ 1
Ji
∑
j ′ = j
RCHARki ( j, j
′) (14)
over all available POS payment instruments Ji = 5 for consumer i resulting
in the average relative characteristics for each payment attribute k. For instance,
RCcosti(credit card) represents the average of the log ratios of the perceived credit
card cost for consumer i to the cost of each of the other payment alternatives for
consumer i . The construction is applied to every consumer regardless of the adoption
stage of payment methods, that is, relative to all payment instruments.
However, to explicitly deal with the different bundles b ∈ B in the adoption stage,
the relative perceived characteristics RCkib of bundle b are constructed as




RCki ( j), (15)
where J˜i is the number of payment instruments adopted by consumer i .
6 Results
In this section, the estimation results of the random utility model according to the
adoption stage are discussed first (Sect. 6.1), thus evaluating the effect of mobile
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payment on the adoption patterns of payment portfolios. Then, the estimation results
of the usage stage are presented (Sect. 6.2), examining the effect of mobile payment
on the usage of payment instruments in different contexts.
6.1 Estimation results of the adoption stage
This section first presents the estimation results of the adoption stage regression. Sec-
ond, the effect of mobile payment on the adoption of payment portfolios is discussed.
6.1.1 Results of the conditional logit model
The estimation results of the conditional logit model are reported in Tables 10 and 11.
Testing for IIA with the Hausman–McFadden test implies that the model is well speci-
fied, that is, dropped alternatives are irrelevant in the majority of cases.20 Additionally,
a Wald test is employed that reveals that mobile payment creates a statistically signif-
icant improvement in model fit.21 This test also demonstrates that the effects are not
statistically different from each other in predicting the adoption of different portfolios
compared to the base outcome.
Overall, corroborating evidence that mobile payment basically has a negatively,
statistically significant effect on the probability of choosing all other payment portfo-
lios relative to the probability of having adopted all five payment methods available,
holding all else constant is found. For instance, it is less likely that individuals who
have used mobile payment adopt payment portfolios including checks compared to
the base outcome. Most prominently, they are significantly less likely to jointly adopt
cash and checks, cash and credit cards, or to solely rely on cash.
Coefficients of the perceived attributes of payment instruments have intuitive signs
and are highly statistically significant, indicating that a more positive rating increases
the demand for one payment bundle while decreasing the demand for the remaining
portfolios. In other words, utility of payment portfolios is increasing in perceived char-
acteristics. For instance, consumers who rate the basket of adopted payment methods
as relatively more secure and convenient are more likely to adopt it, which is in accord
with previous studies (e.g., Schuh and Stavins 2015; Arango et al. 2015a). Education,
age, being male, and having ever been bankrupt are statistically significant in most
of the cases across bundles. The probability of adopting only cash, cash and debit
cards, or cash and prepaid cards, for example, decreases as the level of education
increases. Furthermore, the results illustrate that including attitudinal characteristics
of mobile payment significantly explains heterogenous effects of consumers across
payment portfolios.
However, coefficients are cumbersome to interpret in nonlinear models such as the
conditional logit model, thus average marginal effects are provided in the next section.
20 Test statistics are not provided. The Hausman–McFadden test compares two estimators of the same
parameter, one of which is consistent and efficient (IIA holds), while the other is consistent, but inefficient.
The first estimator is obtained by a correctly specified model; the second is obtained by estimating the
model on a restricted number of payment bundles (cf. Hausman and McFadden 1984).
21 Test statistics are not shown.
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6.1.2 Average marginal effects
To quantitatively appraise changes in payment portfolio choice subsequent to mobile
payment, the average predicted probabilities of choosing each of the payment bundles






(P̂i j |MPi = 1) − (P̂i j |MPi = 0)
}
, (16)
resulting in the average marginal effect (AMEMP) of mobile payment for a typical
person. The effect of mobile payment on the portfolio choice is evaluated as the
difference in the predicted probabilities of having usedmobile payment, while holding
all other factors constant. In this way, substitution patterns across payment portfolios
can be computed.
The predicted probabilities are set out in the first column in Table 12, which can be
compared to the actual frequencies of payment portfolios in the sample (see Table 4).
The overall fit of the model is fairly good seeing that the predicted choice probabilities
correspond closely to the actual frequencies for the entire sample. In other words,
the explanatory variables in the model predict the choice of payment portfolios rather
precisely. This implies that every change in the observed variables, which leads to
a change in the predicted probabilities, is actually closely related to the observed
frequencies. However, the average predicted probabilities are somewhatmore accurate
for specific payment bundles, while they are less precise for other choices. This could
be because some alternatives have considerably higher shares in the sample and are,
therefore, better approximated than less preferred alternatives.
Average marginal effects (AME) of mobile payment for every choice alternative
are set out in the third column in Table 12. The signs of the AME vary across payment
bundles and the magnitude of the effects is very modest compared to the initial prob-
abilities, meaning that the probability of adopting payment portfolios is not highly
dependent on mobile payment.22 There are two main findings: first, mobile payment
increases the probability of adopting the payment bundle including all POS payment
instruments by around 2.1%points at the expense of reducing the probability of choos-
ing portfolios primarily entailing checks (with fewer than five instruments) and cash
as a sole instrument. The reductions range from −0.05 to −0.42 percentage points.
Second, consumers are generally more likely to adopt payment bundles that encom-
pass more than one payment card if they have mobile payment (maximum increase of
+0.12 % points).
To conclude,mobile payment positively influences the probability of having all POS
payment methods. This indicates that this type of payment does not replace physical
payment cards. However, it does reduce the probability of adopting only cash and
payment portfolios containing checks, of which include fewer than five instruments.
22 Attitudinal characteristics of payment methods are expected to have greater impact on the adoption
choice (cf. Schuh and Stavins 2013).
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Table 12 Adoption stage: average marginal effect of mobile payment
Bundle Predicted prob. Predicted prob. w/o MP Average marginal effect
All 29.325 27.188 2.137
DC/CC/SVC 1.124 1.104 0.019
CHK/CC/SVC 5.076 5.458 −0.382
CHK/DC/SVC 8.340 8.618 −0.279
CHK/DC/CC 27.336 27.680 −0.342
CHK/DC 7.504 7.776 −0.273
CHK/CC 6.552 6.975 −0.423
CHK/SVC 0.715 0.726 −0.011
DC/CC 1.068 1.307 −0.240
DC/SVC 2.614 2.499 0.115
CC/SVC 0.472 0.463 0.008
CHK 0.452 0.504 −0.052
DC 1.835 1.980 −0.145
CC 0.264 0.352 −0.088
SVC 4.902 4.538 0.363
CSH 2.422 2.831 −0.409
Note: survey weights used. Numbers are in percentages and percentage points, respectively. CSH refers to cash, CHK to
check, DC to debit, CC to credit, and SVC to prepaid card
This suggests that mobile payment is not a substitute for payment cards, but that it is
for paper-based payment options.
6.2 Estimation results of the usage stage
In this section, the estimation results of the usage stage regression are discussed first.
Second, the impact of mobile payment on the use of traditional payment instruments
in different payment contexts is presented.
6.2.1 Results of the nested logit model
The estimation results of the usage stage regarding the transaction type of overall POS
payments are displayed in Table 13. Tables 14 and 15 separately show the estimation
results of the usage stage for retail and services payments, respectively. At the bottom
of all models estimated, the dissimilarity parameters λ of both nests are presented,
revealing highly significant results of the likelihood ratio test, meaning that the con-
ditional logit model is strongly rejected in favor of the nested logit model, that is,
there is strong evidence for correlated errors. The parameter λ of the nest compris-
ing payment cards is always smaller than one, indicating that payment cards (credit,
debit, and prepaid cards) are closer substitutes for themselves than for those payment
instruments in the other group of paper-based methods. The same is not true for the
nest comprising paper-based payment methods since λ is slightly greater than one.
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Table 13 Nested logit estimates usage stage: POS payments
Variables Check Debit Credit Prepaid
MP −1.465 0.108 0.034 0.493*
(1.021) (0.161) (0.166) (0.281)
Age 0.046 −0.019 −0.040 −0.040
(0.079) (0.025) (0.025) (0.055)
Age2 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Education 0.063 0.168*** 0.243*** 0.181
(0.166) (0.059) (0.060) (0.127)
Income −0.103 0.076* 0.148*** −0.027
(0.125) (0.041) (0.041) (0.110)
Working 0.656 0.798*** 0.736*** 0.614*
(0.510) (0.180) (0.184) (0.330)
Retired 1.719** 0.632*** 0.693*** 1.291**
(0.667) (0.226) (0.230) (0.561)
Other employment 0.452 0.176 0.271 0.212
(0.452) (0.181) (0.186) (0.321)
Male −0.668* −0.586*** −0.520*** −1.062***
(0.364) (0.116) (0.118) (0.354)
Household size −0.086 −0.060 −0.092** 0.050
(0.137) (0.041) (0.043) (0.063)
MP Internet security 0.106 0.180** 0.168** 0.317**
(0.213) (0.074) (0.075) (0.148)
MP text security −0.414* −0.048 −0.067 −0.205
(0.240) (0.077) (0.079) (0.140)
MP voice security 0.099 −0.001 0.019 −0.039
















Variables Check Debit Credit Prepaid
Constant −3.906 −0.740 −0.749 −0.688








Note: base outcome is cash. MP is mobile payment. Base category for employment is unemployed. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Overall, there is compelling evidence that the model is appropriately specified and
consistent with theory.
According to Table 13, the coefficients of mobile payment all show the expected
sign, meaning that mobile payment positively affects the use of payment cards and
negatively affects the use of checks for overall POS payments compared to cash.
It exerts a statistically significant effect on the usage of prepaid cards relative to
cash, whereas the effect is insignificant for the remaining payment instruments (i.e.,
check, debit card, and credit card), holding all else constant. The corresponding joint
significant test (Wald test) affirms that mobile payment has no significant impact on
the use of payment instruments and thus does not statistically significantly improve
model fit.23 Similar findings are provided for retail and services payments (see Tables
14, 15). This finding may reflect the fact that consumers generally do not change their
payment habits at the POS simply because mobile payment technologies are available,
possibly due to both force of habit and general resistance to new technology. Indeed,
Humphrey et al. (1996) argue that individual payment patterns strongly depend on
past compositions and are highly persistent.24
Estimates of the perceived characteristics of payment methods all have expected
signs and are highly statistically significant. The higher the assessment of a payment
method, the more likely that method is to be used, while the probability of using
any of the other methods declines. In other words, individuals who view a specific
payment method as relatively cheaper, more secure, more accepted, more convenient,
more easily set up, and more supportive of tracking payments are more likely to use
that method. Furthermore, overall evidence that education, income, being male, being
retired or working—compared to being unemployed—are statistically significant fac-
tors that predict the employment of payment methods is found. For instance, more
23 Test statistics are not provided.
24 Another reason could be that the possibility of using mobile payment at the POS is not common. In
addition, mobile payment, being new, may not be able to compensate for the benefits of traditional payment
instruments.
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Table 14 Nested logit estimates usage stage: retail payments
Variables Check Debit Credit Prepaid
MP −0.509 0.115 0.109 −0.004
(0.911) (0.182) (0.186) (0.431)
Age 0.281* −0.028 −0.048* 0.037
(0.157) (0.028) (0.028) (0.055)
Age2 −0.002* 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Education −0.078 0.191*** 0.286*** 0.210
(0.198) (0.065) (0.066) (0.129)
Income 0.037 0.108** 0.163*** −0.350**
(0.144) (0.046) (0.046) (0.176)
Working 0.490 0.744*** 0.656*** 0.062
(0.595) (0.197) (0.201) (0.332)
Retired 1.304* 0.632** 0.646** 0.195
(0.730) (0.250) (0.253) (0.464)
Other employment 0.589 0.169 0.217 −0.166
(0.542) (0.200) (0.204) (0.337)
Male −0.736* −0.642*** −0.542*** −0.223
(0.433) (0.129) (0.130) (0.250)
Household size −0.046 −0.012 −0.041 0.150**
(0.166) (0.046) (0.048) (0.075)
MP Internet security −0.180 0.208** 0.182** 0.010
(0.279) (0.084) (0.085) (0.189)
MP text security −0.348 −0.017 −0.041 0.026
(0.290) (0.087) (0.088) (0.164)
MP voice security 0.230 −0.100 −0.054 0.067
















Variables Check Debit Credit Prepaid
Constant −10.599** −0.508 −0.620 −2.465*








Note: base outcome is cash. MP is mobile payment. Base category for employment is unemployed. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
educated, higher income and working individuals are more likely to pay by debit and
credit card for all types of POS payments compared to using cash. In addition, the
likelihood of paying by payment cards rises if consumers rate the Internet security of
mobile payments relatively higher.
In light of the mostly insignificant effects of mobile payment in the regression
analysis, nevertheless, average marginal effects are focused on in the next section.
6.2.2 Average marginal effects
Analogous to Sect. 6.1, the average marginal effect of mobile payment for a typ-
ical person in different payment contexts according to Eq. (16) is computed. The
AMEMP basically represents the difference in the predicted probabilities of paying
by instrument j for transaction type h with and without mobile payment, holding all
else constant. However, according to the model, the effects are not statistically rele-
vant with the exception of the impact on the choice of prepaid cards for overall POS
payments.
The first column of Table 16 sets out the predicted probabilities for overall POS
payments. These are quite close to the actual frequencies in the sample, with the
exception of cash payments (compare Tables 8, 4).25 Thus, the overall fit of the model
is good, as the choice probabilities of check, debit, credit, and prepaid card are rather
precise.
The AMEMP of POS payments is shown in the third column of Table 16. All
effects have expected signs except credit cards and their magnitude is very moderate
ranging from −0.36 to +0.65 percentage points. This implies that the decision to
pay by instrument j at the POS is not much influenced by mobile payment. While
mobile payment typically decreases the probability to choose cash or check as a pay-
ment method at the POS (around −0.27 and −0.24 percentage points, respectively), it
25 The predicted probabilities of cash primarily differ from the sample frequencies due to sample weights,
which tend to account for underrepresented cash payments.
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Table 15 Nested logit estimates usage stage: services payments
Variables Check Debit Credit Prepaid
MP −0.685 0.048 0.046 0.358
(0.838) (0.207) (0.210) (0.282)
Age 0.099 0.005 −0.005 0.015
(0.116) (0.031) (0.031) (0.061)
Age2 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Education 0.366 0.114 0.230*** 0.116
(0.315) (0.087) (0.089) (0.130)
Income 0.036 0.106** 0.188*** 0.105
(0.165) (0.053) (0.053) (0.093)
Working 0.623 0.591*** 0.385* −0.163
(0.724) (0.227) (0.229) (0.337)
Retired 1.558* 0.749** 0.809*** 0.631
(0.947) (0.305) (0.308) (0.601)
Other employment 0.006 0.153 0.156 −0.306
(0.645) (0.223) (0.226) (0.364)
Male −1.148* −0.527*** −0.484*** −0.589**
(0.606) (0.168) (0.170) (0.262)
Household size −0.075 −0.009 −0.051 0.069
(0.185) (0.053) (0.055) (0.071)
MP Internet security 0.741* 0.357*** 0.344*** 0.435***
(0.397) (0.114) (0.115) (0.164)
MP text security −0.571 −0.072 −0.063 −0.294*
(0.400) (0.111) (0.112) (0.163)
MP voice security −0.112 −0.117 −0.104 −0.154













Constant −7.725 −1.095 −1.401 −0.830












Note: base outcome is cash. MP is mobile payment. Base category for employment is unemployed. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 16 Usage stage: AME of mobile payment for POS payments
Instrument Predicted prob. Predicted prob. w/o MP Average marginal effect
Cash 39.155 39.428 −0.270
Check 3.874 4.109 −0.240
Debit 36.605 35.975 0.648
Credit 19.320 19.673 −0.364
Prepaid 1.046 0.815 0.227
Note: survey weights used. Numbers are in percentages and percentage points, respectively
Table 17 Usage stage: AME of mobile payment for retail payments
Instrument Predicted prob. Predicted prob. w/o MP Average marginal effect
Cash 34.229 34.550 −0.317
Check 3.728 3.816 −0.092
Debit 39.925 39.557 0.374
Credit 20.903 20.823 0.069
Prepaid 1.215 1.254 −0.034
Note: survey weights used. Numbers are in percentages and percentage points, respectively
increases the likelihood of paying by debit or prepaid card (+0.65 and +0.23 percent-
age points, respectively). Ironically, the effect of mobile payment on the probability
of paying by credit card is negative (−0.36 percentage points). This could be because
mobile payment users prefer debit and prepaid cards that determine the underlying
payment process. It is also very likely that mobile payment negatively affects the use
of paper-based methods in favor of card-based methods, particularly debit card usage.
This effect is more pronounced in the context of retail payments, as the magnitude of
the effect on cash and checks nearly offsets the one on debit card use. Thus, mobile
payment may act as a substitute for paper-based instruments, especially cash.
Similar findings are separately reported both for retail and services payments in
Tables 17 and 18, respectively. Overall, the effects are not very sizeable compared
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Table 18 Usage stage: AME of mobile payment for services payments
Instrument Predicted prob. Predicted prob. w/o MP Average marginal effect
Cash 34.349 34.572 −0.243
Check 6.058 6.288 −0.236
Debit 36.950 36.879 0.095
Credit 20.727 20.659 0.066
Prepaid 1.915 1.602 0.317
Note: survey weights used. Numbers are in percentages and percentage points, respectively
to the choice probabilities. For retail payments, mobile payment positively affects
debit and credit card usage by around 0.37 and 0.07 percentage points, respectively,
whereas it negatively influences cash, check, and prepaid card use (by roughly −0.32,
−0.09, and −0.03 percentage points, respectively). Moreover, mobile payment has a
negative impact on the probability of using cash and check for services payments by
approximately−0.24 percentage points. In contrast, it fosters the use of payment cards
for services payments ranging from +0.07 to +0.32 percentage points. This could
indicate that mobile payment especially facilitates electronic payment processing at
places (e.g., fast food counters) where consumers typically desire a faster checkout.26
To conclude, there is suggestive evidence at the usage stage that mobile payment
generally tends to substitute for paper-based payment methods and complement card-
based instruments, especially debit cards, with regard to POS payments. However, the
magnitude of the impact is not very sizeable.With respect to specific retail and services
payments, these effects principally remain stable, but vary in terms of magnitude and
sign. That the estimates of mobile payment are not always statistically significant,
however, suggests that current individual payment compositions are not influenced by
mobile payment technologies and are thus determined by other factors. The usage of
payment instruments seems to be strongly habitual and unconscious, which in turn
may impede the take up of innovative payment products. In addition, supply-side
restrictions, that is, the non-acceptance of mobile payment by merchants, may prove
a barrier to the widespread use of mobile payment technologies.
7 Plausibility check
At this stage, the question arises as to how reasonable and robust the results are. Alter-
native estimation strategies are not focused here since the presented test statistics of
the estimated models all demonstrate that the models are well specified. Rather, the
data set used with respect to the question about mobile payment usage is critically
scrutinized. To this end, the latest report by Brown et al. (2015)—published by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRS)—who exclusively examine
the adoption and use of mobile banking and mobile payment as well as individual
26 For instance, services payments comprise purchases at bars, and fast food restaurants as well as for
transportation and tolls, among others.
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interaction with financial institutions facilitated by mobile phones and other technolo-
gies is drawn on.27 The survey has been conducted online every year in December
since 2011, using a representative sample of the U.S. population aged 18 and older.
The latest survey is from 2014.
Comparing responses to the survey question about mobile payment usage in 2012
between the SCPC and FRS illustrates that the number of users does not vary much
(18 vs. 15 %). In 2014, the latter figure provided by the FRS increased to 22 %. The
FRS also shows that the median reported frequency of mobile payment was two times
in the month prior to the 2014 survey, although roughly 18 % of respondents reported
using this method more than five times. Further, around 27% of mobile payment users
had employed the method in the past year, but not in the month prior to the survey.
This rather sporadic and low rate of usage may explain why mobile payment does not
causally impact the use of conventional payment instruments in the empirical analysis
above. It appears that this technology is still in its infancy (cf. Rogers 2003).
The chief reasons given by individuals for never using mobile payment are that it
is easier to pay with other methods (75 %), they do not see a clear benefit from mobile
payment (59 %), and they have security concerns about it (59 %) (cf. Brown et al.
2015). Thus, to make a success of mobile payment, the payment industry will need
to address these issues and improve the perception of mobile payment. Interestingly,
the facts and figures expressed above are similar to ones found in a recent survey
in Germany conducted by the Deutsche Bundesbank (2015): a tiny share of roughly
2–4 % regularly uses mobile payment. Thus, it appears that security concerns as well
as the lack of a perceived need for the service are the main rationales for non-usage.
Another striking finding relates to the funding principle ofmobile payment.Accord-
ing to Brown et al. (2015), debit cards (55 %), credit cards (51 %), and bank account
deductions (41 %) are the most ways of funding mobile purchases. It is, therefore,
likely that mobile payment will affect card payments more extensively the more inten-
sively it will be used.
8 Conclusion
This paper is the first to investigate the impact of mobile payment on the adoption and
usage of traditional retail payment instruments at the POS using a comprehensive U.S.
data set on individual payment patterns. Applying the random utility framework for
estimation yields the following important results. First, mobile payment increases the
probability of possessing all available payment instruments at the POS by roughly 2%
points and reduces the likelihood of adopting payment portfolios that include checks
and only cash. This finding implies that mobile payment does not replace physical
payment cards, but does act as a substitute for paper-based payment methods. Second,
no causal relationship between mobile payment and the use of traditional payment
means, except prepaid cards, was found. In other words, mobile payment does not
statistically significantly impact the usage of payment instruments at the POS, but
27 Unfortunately, the survey does not provide any information on the adoption and use of other payment
instruments.
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positively does so for prepaid cards. The estimation provides supportive evidence
that mobile payment principally serves as a complement to card payments and as a
substitute for paper-based payment methods such as cash and check, as it could allow
for more efficient checkout. Overall, the results of the usage stage may reflect the
fact that payment instrument use seems to strongly depend on other factors, including
perceived characteristics of payment methods, individual habits, and automatism. This
study fits into the existing literature on consumer payment choice and contributes to
understanding the role of mobile payment in the retail payment landscape.
The findings have several important implications. First, the results show that the
payment industry should actively promotemobile payment products, as doing so could
speed the shift from paper-based products to electronic payment cards, which, in turn,
is a prerequisite for faster proliferation of electronic payment transactions. The results
also highlight the important difference between the extensive and intensive margin of
payment products and thus should motivate private industry to expend more effort on
incentivizing mobile payment usage, as more frequent use also tends to foster elec-
tronic (card) payments and, consequently, increase profits. Second, the findings imply
that the overall payment system can benefit from the decreasing social costs inherent
in the shift from paper- to card-based payment methods. Third, although mobile pay-
ment does not always have causal effects on the use of payment means, policymakers
should be aware of different consumer regulations and regulatory agencies that cover
the payment method used to fund mobile payment (cf. Martin 2012).
The study is subject to a number of limitations. The information onmobile payment
usage in the survey may not be sufficient to analyze its impact in detail. For instance, it
is unclear how many times mobile payment is deployed at the POS prior to the survey,
which could affect the use of traditional payment instruments more significantly. In
addition, the data set may suffer from recall effects since respondents may have for-
gotten or could be conceptually uncertain about the number of card payments made
via a mobile device. If such is the case, it would lead to a possible underestimation
of the corresponding effects. In addition, although the multiple forms of mobile pay-
ment enable paying at the POS, the survey does not provide sufficient information on
whether mobile payments have been solely used for POS payments. In this sense, the
channels through which mobile payment affects traditional payment instrument use
may be confounded. Therefore, payment surveys that collect detailed information on
the usage of different mobile payment types would obtain more accurate results.
Furthermore, missing information about supply-side factors in the data set could
lead to correlated error terms. Because mobile payment represents a relatively new
formof payment, it could be less accepted bymerchants, for instance, due to inadequate
infrastructure or personal reservations. As a consequence, the unavailability of mobile
payment at the POS could result in negative feedback effects for consumers and thus
in less mobile payment usage. Some evidence in support of this idea is provided by
Rysman (2007), who finds that people tend to choose a specific card brand when a
large number ofmerchants accept this brand. Thus, data onmerchants’mobile payment
acceptance would help mitigate this issue.
With respect to external validity, the extent to which the findings can be general-
ized to other countries is uncertain, as major cultural and institutional differences in
payment markets across countries are prevalent. For instance, the heavy and earlier
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reliance on payment cards rather than credit transfer and cash in the United States
compared to Europe could have induced U.S. consumers to be more open-minded
toward innovative payment products in terms of adoption and usage. Therefore, the
magnitude and significance of the estimated effects of mobile payment may differ
across payment areas. In addition, there are many different types of mobile payment
technology with varying incidence across countries. For example, mobile payment
may be quite popular in developing countries for person-to-person payments due
to these countries’ vast number of unbanked and underbanked persons, whereas it
may be more frequently used at the POS in developed countries. Thus, the impact of
mobile payment across countries may vary in terms of the underlying technological
concept.
In the end, it remains unclear how mobile payment exactly affects the use of tra-
ditional payment instruments. Possibly it is improved efficiency and convenience
compared to traditional payment instruments that drives its deployment, as several
studies presume (see Sect. 2). However, to obtain a clear picture of the specific chan-
nels through which mobile payment has an effect on other payment methods and to
provide detailed results of its multiple forms of applications and features, it is neces-
sary to collect qualitatively improved data on mobile payment usage in all its facets;
this is left for future research.
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